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Justice Rehnquist’s Theory of Indian Law: 




“I am convinced that a well-defined body of principles is essential in order to  
end the need for case-by-case litigation which has plagued this area of the law  
for a number of years.”2 
- Justice William Rehnquist, 1980 
 
I.  Introduction 
 Almost immediately upon taking his seat on the United States Supreme Court in 
1972, Justice Rehnquist demonstrated an interest in Indian law, writing the opinion for 
the Court in the 1975 decision, United States v. Mazurie.3  In the following twenty-seven 
years on the Court, both as an associate justice and as chief justice, Rehnquist 
continued to demonstrate an interest in refining the Indian law jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court.  Rehnquist’s opinions in his first eight years on the Court included eight 
majority opinions and four dissents in the field of Indian law.4  His impact on Indian law 
goes beyond what even his long tenure on the Court would suggest.5  Through 
consistency of ideology, sheer number of opinions authored, and eventually through 
seniority on the Court, Rehnquist built a body of law that introduced new limits on tribal 
sovereignty, and that stands as precedent for any future cases the Court takes in this 
area. 
 This paper will trace the evolution of Rehnquist’s theory of Indian law and his use 
of precedent and history through a chronological analysis of the key majority decisions 
that he wrote, and also through two key opinions in which he participated but did not 
write for the majority.  These opinions reflect Rehnquist’s evolution from a theory of 
Indian law relatively affirming of tribal sovereignty, including the right of tribes to 
regulate the activities of non-Indians on tribal lands, to a theory of implied divestiture of 
tribal authority which gave regulatory power increasingly to the states.  In his time on 
the Court, Rehnquist largely rewrote the foundational cases in Indian law, authored by 
Chief Justice John Marshall in the early 19th century.   
                                                 
1 J.D. Candidate, 2012, Seattle University School of Law. I would like to thank Emily McReynolds for her 
excellent suggestions and help through the editing process, Professor Eric Eberhard for his guidance 
over the past two years and for his thoughtful review of multiple drafts of this paper, and the staff of the 
American Indian Law Journal for the opportunity to contribute to this important discussion. 
2 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 176 (1980).  
3 United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). 
4 David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in 





 The foundational cases, known as the Marshall trilogy, include Johnson v. 
McIntosh (1823),6 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831),7 and Worcester v. Georgia 
(1832).8  In Johnson, Marshall articulated the doctrine of discovery, where according to 
Marshall Indians had a right of occupancy on the land, however by discovery the 
Europeans gained “absolute ultimate title.”9  Marshall followed the Johnson opinion by 
writing Cherokee, where he found that the tribes are “domestic dependent nations.”10   
 In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall made his most emphatic endorsement of tribal 
sovereignty.  He used strong statements to carry his point, writing that “the several 
Indian nations [are] distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within 
which their authority is exclusive,”11 and that within those boundaries “the laws of 
Georgia can have no force.”12  Professor David Getches has summarized Marshall’s 
“ringing, unmistakable” endorsement of tribal sovereignty by capturing the essential 
language Marshall used in Worcester, including references to “national character,” “right 
of self-government,” “nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war,” 
“distinct, independent political communities,” “Indian nations,” “political existence,” and 
“pre-existing power of the nation to govern itself.”13 
 Rehnquist took this precedent in a very different direction from Marshall, 
reflecting his focus on limiting the inherent sovereignty of tribes to internal matters.  
According to Rehnquist, the authority of a tribe could properly be exercised only over 
tribal members.  Once a non-member entered the picture, Rehnquist shifted his stance 
to one of implied divestiture of tribal authority, meaning that a tribe could exert limited or 
no authority over non-Indian persons unless and until the federal government delegated 
that authority to the tribe.  Otherwise, the exercise of tribal authority over non-Indians is 
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.14  This shift also allowed Rehnquist 
leeway to assert his states’ rights perspective. 
 In addition to tracing Rehnquist’s theory of Indian law, this paper will also follow 
his use of history and precedent in applying his theory of implied divestiture.  While 
early decisions authored by Rehnquist relied on prior case precedent, in later years he 
increasingly employed history and custom to make his point.  Towards the end of his 
time on the Court, Rehnquist returned again to precedent, some of it in case law written 
by his own hand.  Throughout, he relied on fact-specific analysis in order to reach his 
conclusions.  Part II begins with consideration of Rehnquist’s early years on the Court. 
                                                 
6 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
7 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
8 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
9 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592. 
10 Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 2. 
11 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557. 
12 Id. at 561. 
13 Getches, supra note 3, at 1577 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 547-62). 
14 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978).  “Upon incorporation into the 
territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United 
States and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict with the interestes of this 





II.  1972 – 1980:  Early Years on the Court 
 Justice Rehnquist’s most dramatic transformation in the area of Indian law took 
place in the 1970s.  As a relative newcomer to the Supreme Court, Rehnquist applied 
different techniques to reach decisions in Indian law cases, and his written opinions 
reflect this experimentation.  His first opinion as an associate justice, United States v. 
Mazurie,15 was relatively supportive of tribal sovereignty, while his last authored opinion 
in this period, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,16 marks one of the most profound 
limitations on tribal sovereignty in the history of the Court. 
A.  Mazurie and Moe:  The Beginning of the Implied Divestiture Theory 
 In the 1975 decision United States v. Mazurie, the Court addressed the question 
of whether the Wind River Tribes could require that a bar owner on fee land within the 
boundaries of the reservation obtain both a State of Wyoming license and a tribal 
license in order to sell liquor.17  In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the power of 
Congress to delegate its regulatory authority to the Wind River Tribes.18  Rehnquist 
explained that “Congress has the constitutional authority to control the sale of alcoholic 
beverages by non-Indians on fee-patented land within the boundaries of an Indian 
reservation, and . . . Congress could validly make a delegation of this authority to a 
reservation’s tribal council.”19   
 This holding is relatively unique in Rehnquist opinions, as it was supportive of 
tribal authority despite attempts by the Mazuries to establish that the “State of Wyoming 
had jurisdiction over non-Indians and their lands within the reservation.”20  In support of 
his reasoning Rehnquist revisited early Indian law cases, including cases in support of 
the proposition that “Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of 
sovereignty over both their members and their territory,”21 and that tribes are a 
“‘separate people,’ possessing ‘the power of regulating their internal and social 
relations.’”22 
 In reaching this conclusion, Rehnquist relied heavily on fact-specific analysis of 
the location of the bar within the reservation of the Wind River Tribes.  Indeed, the case 
largely turned on whether the bar’s location could be considered “Indian Country,” and 
among other factors, the Court considered the proportion of Indian families in the area, 
the number of Indian students in the state school nearby, and even the testimony of the 
                                                 
15 Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). 
16 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
17 Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 546. 
18 Id. at 558. 
19 Id. at 546. 
20 Id. at 552. 
21 Id. at 557 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557). 
22 Id. (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886), and McClanahan v. Arizona State 




bar owner, indicating that the bar served both Indian and non-Indian patrons:  “We are 
kind of out there by ourselves, you know.”23 
 Justice Rehnquist’s next majority opinion, Moe v. Confederated Salish and 
Kotenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation,24 followed quickly after Mazurie in 1976 and is 
Rehnquist’s first articulation of his theory of implied divestiture.  Like Mazurie, Moe was 
a unanimous decision by the Court.  This was the first opinion by Rehnquist relating to 
taxation, answering specifically the question of whether reservation sales of cigarettes 
to Indians were subject to taxation by the State of Montana.  Relying on McClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Commission,25 the Court upheld the District Court finding that sales 
to Indians were not subject to the state tax, but that the tax must be imposed on sales to 
non-Indians.26 
 In the opinion, Rehnquist differentiated between what he saw as the inherent 
power of the tribe to govern its internal affairs,27 and the power of the state to tax the 
activities of non-members within its boundaries, even if those activities occur on a 
reservation.  He began by citing to McClanahan for the proposition that “[i]n the special 
area of state taxation . . . there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian 
reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the 
reservation.”28  However, the state’s sales tax may be imposed on non-Indian 
purchases because it is a “minimal burden designed to avoid the likelihood [that] non-
Indians purchasing from the tribal seller will avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax.”29 
 The Moe opinion is thus a significant departure from Chief Justice Marshall’s 
view of tribal sovereignty as found in Worcester v. Georgia.  In Worcester, Marshall 
wrote that the laws of the state have no force within the reservation;30 in Moe, Rehnquist 
found that since the burden on the tribe in collecting the tax from non-Indians was 
minimal, the state law could apply on the reservation.31  He commented: “We see 
nothing in this burden which frustrates tribal self-government.”32  
 Mazurie and Moe thus represent initial attempts by Rehnquist at defining a 
doctrine of Indian law.  Most notably his theory of implied divestiture is first articulated in 
Moe, where he found that a state could reach across the borders of the reservation to 
collect tax from sales to non-Indians without infringing on the right of the tribe to govern 
                                                 
23 Id. at 551.  
24 Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kotenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
25 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
26 Moe, 425 U.S. at 483. “[T]he State may require the Indian proprietor simply to add the tax to the sales 
price.”  Rehnquist relies on McClanahan throughout the opinion, beginning with a reference to the 
decision of the District Court.  Id. at 468. 
27 Such as sales of cigarettes to tribal members. 
28 Moe, 425 U.S. at 475-76 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) 
(summarizing McClanahan)). 
29 Id. at 483. 
30 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561. 
31 Moe, 425 U.S. at 483. 




the reservation.  In both cases, he relied on prior Supreme Court precedent for his 
authority, an approach that would begin to shift in his next two decisions.  
 
B.  Rosebud and Oliphant:  History and Culture Replace Precedent 
 While Rehnquist is perhaps best known for his use of history as a basis for the 
Court’s holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,33 his first attempt at this 
approach may be found in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip.34  Written in 1977, a year 
before Oliphant, Rosebud addressed the question of whether the original boundaries of 
the reservation had been diminished by three acts of Congress passed in 1904, 1907, 
and 1910 respectively.35  The Court affirmed the original District Court holding that 
these acts “did clearly evidence congressional intent to diminish the boundaries of the 
Rosebud Sioux Reservation.”36 
 At the outset of the opinion, Justice Rehnquist set out the basis for his statutory 
analysis, writing that “[a] congressional determination to terminate [an Indian 
reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding 
circumstances and legislative history.”37  Rehnquist began by describing the original 
1889 reservation boundaries.  He then shifted to the well-established principle that 
“[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people 
who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith,”38 before 
declaring that the “mere fact that a reservation has been opened to settlement does not 
necessarily mean that the opened area has lost its reservation status.”39 
 Moving from basic principles to a discussion of the 1904, 1907, and 1910 Acts, 
Rehnquist used history and legislative intent to show that the reservation had in fact 
been diminished in a lawful manner.  He traced the history of the three bills through 
Congress, relying on the floor discussion by the sponsor of one Act, and the historical 
record showing the representations of the Secretary of the Interior, while ignoring the 
constitution of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe that Secretary of the Interior had approved in 
1935.40  Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissent drew on the language of the tribe’s 
constitution providing that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe . . . shall extend 
to the territory within the original confines of the Rosebud Reservation boundaries as 
established by the act of March 2, 1889.”41  Rehnquist may have been responding to 
Justice Marshall’s dissent when he replied, “[W]e cannot remake history.”42  
                                                 
33 Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
34 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). 
35 Id. at 584. 
36 Id. at 587. 
37 Id. at 586 (citing Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973) (emphasis added)).  
38 Id. at 586 (citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174).   
39 Id. at 586-87 (citing Mattz, 412 U.S. at 505). 
40 Id. at 616 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing the constitution of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, App. 1396-1397, Art. I). 




 Rehnquist more fully developed the historical approach in the 1978 decision 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, which addressed the issue of whether Indian tribal 
courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.43  In finding that tribal courts do not 
have jurisdiction over non-Indians, Rehnquist’s analytical approach was very similar to 
Rosebud Sioux.  According to Professor Getches, what is “most remarkable, though, is 
not the thin historical record on which the [Oliphant] Court relied; rather, it is the fact that 
conjectures about the past were used to justify a legal principal fixing the limits of tribal 
sovereignty.”44  Certainly, Rehnquist’s choice of history was selective and could be 
considered misleading. 
 Rehnquist began his analysis by noting the fact that twelve Indian tribes besides 
the Suquamish Tribe had enacted ordinances giving the tribes criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indian defendants.45  He drew, however, on the authority of the Attorney General in 
1834, rather than case precedent, in asserting that “tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, is inter alia, inconsistent with treaty provisions recognizing the sovereignty of 
the United Sates over the territory assigned to the Indian nation and the dependence of 
the Indians on the United States.”46   
 Most of the rest of the opinion is devoted to historical references, including 
treaties signed by Indian tribes in Washington in the 1850s, the 1834 Western Territory 
Bill, the 1891 Supreme Court decision In re Mayfield, and a 1960 Senate report.47  For 
example, Rehnquist found the Court’s holding in the 1891 case In re Mayfield instructive 
because “the policy of Congress had been to allow the inhabitants of the Indian country 
‘such power of self government as was thought to be consistent with the safety of the 
white population with which they may have come in contact, and to encourage them as 
far as possible in raising themselves to our standard of civilization.’”48   
 Rehnquist cited to little case precedent in Oliphant.  While the opinion by Chief 
Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia is most often cited in support of tribal 
sovereignty, in this opinion, Rehnquist instead referred twice to Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia as precedent for limitations on tribal authority.  Rehnquist cited Cherokee for 
the propositions (1) that tribes do retain “elements of ‘quasi-sovereign’ authority after 
ceding their lands to the United States and announcing their dependence on the 
Federal Government,”49 and (2) that foreign nations may not form political connections 
with tribes because tribes are “completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the 
United States.”50  He relied on Worcester only for the proposition that “Indian nations 
were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on [the United States] . . . for their 
protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country.”51  Rehnquist also 
                                                 
43 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195.   
44 Getches, supra note 3, at 1597. 
45 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196.   
46 Id. at 199.  The Attorney General’s opinion in 1834 would not have been controlling precedent in the 
way that Worcester, decided in 1832, would be considered precedent for future Court decisions. 
47 Id. at 197-206. 
48 Id. at 204 (citing In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 115-116 (1891)). 
49 Id. at 208. 
50 Id. at 209. 




cited to the first case of the Marshall trilogy, Johnson v. McIntosh, to show that tribes’ 
rights “to complete sovereignty, as independent nations [are] necessarily diminished.”52 
 Another notable citation in Oliphant is to a dissenting opinion by Justice Johnson 
in the 1810 Supreme Court decision Fletcher v. Peck,53 which Rehnquist incorrectly 
categorized as a concurrence with the majority.54  He referred to Fletcher for what he 
termed the “intrinsic” limitations on Indian tribal authority, and which he believed were 
not “restricted to limitations on the tribes’ power to transfer lands or exercise external 
political sovereignty.”55  He chose the following passage from Fletcher to quote directly:   
[T]he restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount . . . to an 
exclusion of all competitors [to the United States] from their markets; and 
the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to the right of governing 
every person within their limits except themselves.56 
 
This citation shows that Rehnquist’s theory of implied divestiture draws in part from a 
dissenting opinion in an 1810 case.  Rehnquist’s belief that Indian tribes only have 
authority to govern themselves, first seen in Moe, was most clearly set forth here in 
Oliphant. 
 Oliphant has been roundly criticized because of Rehnquist’s unconventional use 
of the Marshall trilogy in support of the holding.57  His use of history also makes 
Oliphant remarkable in its departure from previously established principles of tribal 
sovereignty.  The next section considers Rehnquist’s support for Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s opinion in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez58 as a test of ideological 
consistency with the Oliphant opinion.  
C. Santa Clara Pueblo:  Making Sense of Rehnquist’s Joining in Marshall’s 
Majority 
 Santa Clara Pueblo, decided in 1978, limited the negative impact of Oliphant.  In 
addressing the question of whether a federal court may review the validity of a tribal 
ordinance denying membership to the children of certain female tribal members,59 the 
Court answered in the negative, strongly affirming inherent tribal authority.60  In Part II of 
the opinion, Justice Marshall relied on Worcester v. Georgia in asserting that tribes are 
“‘distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights’ in 
                                                 
52 Id. at 210.   
53 Id. at 209 (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)). 
54 Id. Justice Johnson clearly indicates he is writing a dissent, see Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 145.   
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 209 (quoting Justice Johnson in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 147 (1810), emphasis added by 
Rehnquist).   
57 See e.g., Getches, supra note 3, at 1595. 
58 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
59 Id. at 51. 




matters of local self government.”61  He continued:  “As separate sovereigns pre-
existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by 
those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state 
authority.”62   
 Justice Rehnquist joined in all Parts of the Court’s opinion, with the exception of 
Part III.  Part I describes the procedural posture of the case, while Part II references 
precedent generally affirming tribal sovereignty.  In Part IV, Justice Marshall found that 
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 did not provide a cause of action for the declaratory 
and injunctive relief asserted by the respondents.63  Part V included the holding, and 
also referenced Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, although Marshall seemed to believe 
Cherokee was not entirely controlling:   
Although we early rejected the notion that Indian tribes are ‘foreign states’ 
for jurisdictional purposes under Article III . . . we have also recognized 
that tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which, by government 
structure, culture, and sources of sovereignty are in many ways foreign to 
the constitutional institutions of the federal and state governments.64 
 Part III, which Rehnquist did not join, addressed in two short paragraphs the 
question of whether the tribes posses “common-law immunity from suit traditionally 
enjoyed by sovereign powers.”65  In Part III, Justice Marshall concluded that “[i]n the 
absence here of any unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent . . . suits 
against the tribe under the [Indian Civil Rights Act] are barred by its sovereign immunity 
from suit.”66  Rehnquist, having introduced his theory of implied divestiture in Moe, here 
remained ideologically consistent in refusing to join the section of the Santa Clara 
Pueblo opinion that presumes immunity from suit until Congress indicates otherwise.67  
 Because Rehnquist did not write the Santa Clara Pueblo opinion, any attempt at 
analysis is to some extent hypothesizing.  Regardless, Santa Clara Pueblo serves as a 
useful test for ideological consistency against his written opinions.  Moving into the 
1980s, and his concurring/dissenting opinion in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
                                                 
61 Id. at 55 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559). 
62 Id. at 56.  
63 Id. at 69.  
64 Id. at 71.  
65 Id. at 58.  Part II introduces the question, which is considered in Part III. 
66 Id. at 59. 
67 Review of Rehnquist’s voting in later cases shows inconsistency on the question of sovereign immunity 
from suit.  In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) 
Rehnquist voted with five other justices to uphold sovereign immunity from suit on contracts.  Id. at 760.  
In C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411 (2001), 
Rehnquist voted with a unanimous court holding that the tribe waived its sovereign immunity from suit by 
signing a contract that included an arbitration clause. Id. at 423.  Finally, he referred to the principle of 
sovereign immunity in Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 




the Colville Indian Reservation,68 Rehnquist would make his first attempt at a bright line 
rule for future Supreme Court decisions. 
III.  1980s: Attempting a Bright Line Rule in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
the Colville Indian Reservation   
 Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, after which point he came increasingly 
to rely on other justices to write most Indian law opinions for the majority.69  Thus, the 
most representative illustration of Rehnquist’s perspective in this period comes from the 
1980 decision, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 
where Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part from Justice White’s majority 
opinion. 
 Justice White, writing for the majority in Colville, found that a state may tax the 
sale of cigarettes on the reservation to non-members of the tribe.70  Justice Rehnquist 
wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, which continued his 
historical approach from Rosebud and Oliphant and also drew heavily upon precedent 
in supporting his position.71   
 Rehnquist began by noting that “[s]ince early in the last century, this Court has 
been struggling to develop a coherent doctrine by which to measure with some 
predictability the scope of Indian immunity from state taxation.”72  He made clear that he 
hoped his opinion would establish a bright line rule in the state taxation area of Indian 
law: “I am convinced that a well-defined body of principles is essential in order to end 
the need for case-by-case litigation which has plagued this area of the law for a number 
of years.” 73  
 Moving into the analysis, Rehnquist delved into issues of state taxing power 
through precedent, in particular McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.74  He 
noted that “McClanahan established a rule against finding that ‘ambiguous statutes 
abolish by implication Indian tax immunities.’”75  He next moved to Mescalero Apache 
Tribe v. Jones,76 the companion case to McClanahan.77  Mescalero was important to 
Rehnquist because the Court “reviewed the tradition of sovereignty and found that no 
                                                 
68 Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
69 Getches, supra note 3, at 1634. 
70 Getches, supra note 3, at 1600.   
71 Id. at 1605. Professor Getches notes that Rehnquist’s opinion was originally written as a dissent to a 
majority opinion written by Justice Breyer.  This may explain the detailed analysis found in Rehnquist’s 
opinion. 
72 Colville, 447 U.S. at 176. 
73 Id.  
74 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
75 Colville, 447 U.S. at 179. 
76 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). 




tribal sovereign immunity for off-reservation activities had traditionally been 
recognized.”78 
 Nowhere is Rehnquist’s states’ rights approach more apparent than in the 
beginning of Part II of his concurrence in Colville, where he noted that “[a]t issue here is 
not only Indian sovereignty, but also state sovereignty as well.”79  He moved into a 
discussion of Thomas v. Gay, an 1898 case which allowed state taxation of cattle 
owned by non-Indians on land leased from the tribe.80  This analysis of a late 19th 
century case formed part of the “‘backdrop’ which support[ed] Washington’s power to 
impose the tax in issue.”81   
 Rehnquist’s opinion in Colville is thus consistent with both his theory that tribes 
have inherent authority in governing internal affairs, but are impliedly divested of 
authority in all other areas, and with his deference to states’ rights, especially when a 
state is attempting to tax non-Indians with respect to goods purchased on a reservation.  
One of the next cases to address this issue came a little more than a decade later, in 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma.82  
IV.  1990 – 2001:  Staying the Course in Citizen Band Potawatomi and Atkinson 
 Two decisions coming out of the 1990s and early 2000s are helpful to a 
discussion of Rehnquist’s theory of Indian law: Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen 
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma (1991), and Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. 
Shirley (2001).83 
 In Citizen Band Potawatomi, Rehnquist wrote for the majority to invalidate a state 
cigarette tax on tribal members who live in “Indian Country.”  While this may at first 
seem inconsistent with prior opinions, careful examination reveals Rehnquist’s 
consistent application of his theory of implied divestiture.  In the opinion, he relied on 
Santa Clara Pueblo (Part II), “Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign 
immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.”84  While the 
State of Oklahoma may not impose its tax on tribal members, Rehnquist found that the 
state may tax sales to non-members of the tribe.85 
 Ten years after Citizen Band Potawatomi, Rehnquist wrote what would become 
his final opinion on Indian law, Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley.  In Atkinson, the 
Court found that tribes lack civil authority to tax businesses operated by non-members 
                                                 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 181.  
80 Getches, supra note 3, at 1605 (discussing Colville, 447 U.S. at 182).  
81 Colville, 447 U.S. at 183.  
82 Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
83 Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
84 Id. at 509, (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58).  




on fee land within a reservation.86  This decision implicated states’ rights, in a manner 
consistent with Rehnquist’s other taxation decisions. 
 In so finding, Rehnquist discussed both of the exceptions from Montana v. United 
States,87 before finding that neither applied in this case.  Montana, decided in 1981, 
reiterated the idea that the “inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend 
to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”88  In Montana, the Court found two 
exceptions to this rule:  (1) a tribe may regulate the “activities of non members who 
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” 89 and (2) a tribe may “exercise civil 
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that 
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”90  In considering these exceptions, 
Rehnquist found that neither had the non-members at issue in the case subjected 
themselves to tribal authority (exception 1), nor had they imperiled the welfare of the 
tribe (exception 2). 
 In Atkinson, Rehnquist returned again to Justice Johnson’s dissenting opinion in 
the 1810 decision Fletcher v. Peck, in support of the idea that “Indian tribes have lost 
any ‘right of governing every person within their limits except themselves.’”91  As extra 
support for this concept, Rehnquist returned to his first opinion written on the question of 
Indian law, Mazurie, for the proposition that:  “Indian tribes are ‘unique aggregations 
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,’ but 
their dependent status generally precludes extension of tribal civil authority beyond 
those limits.”92 
 Atkinson relied less on history than earlier Rehnquist opinions, perhaps because 
by this point in time Rehnquist was able to cite to his own decisions as precedent.  
Rehnquist may also have known this would be one of his final opportunities to write an 
opinion in the area of Indian law, since the opinion appears carefully and intentionally 
consistent with his earlier work in this area. 
V.  Conclusion 
 Almost immediately upon taking his seat on the Supreme Court, Justice 
Rehnquist began to move the Court away from established Indian law jurisprudence 
which had stood largely intact since Chief Justice Marshall wrote the trilogy of Johnson, 
Cherokee, and Worcester in the early 19th century.  In the area of taxation, his attempts 
to generate bright line rules turned instead into fact-specific analysis that emphasized 
states’ rights.  In the area of jurisdiction, he found that tribes do not have criminal 
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jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation, and that tribes do not have civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on fee land within the reservation.  His analysis of 
tribal sovereignty emphasized what he viewed as the dependent status of the tribes on 
the federal government.  He developed analytical techniques that relied heavily on use 
of historical facts chosen to prove his point.  And he relied heavily on a dissenting 
opinion from Fletcher v. Peck, which was written thirteen years before the first case in 
the Marshall trilogy. 
  While Rehnquist is no longer on the Supreme Court, his body of jurisprudence 
stands as precedent in any future Indian law cases the Court considers.  Chief Justice 
Roberts, in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.,93 cited 
Atkinson for the Montana rule, or the “general proposition that the inherent sovereign 
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”94  It 
is likely that any future decision of the Court regarding the extent of tribal authority 
would need to address one or more opinions authored by Rehnquist, with the result that 
the trend away from the recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty in the Court’s 
jurisprudence may well continue for some time to come. 
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